Monetary policy under inflation targeting: lessons from industrial and emerging countries by Aliqoriev, Olimkhon & Khamidov, Khalilillo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Monetary policy under inflation
targeting: lessons from industrial and
emerging countries
Olimkhon Aliqoriev and Khalilillo Khamidov
Institute of forecasting and macroeconomic research
5. May 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59540/
MPRA Paper No. 59540, posted 31. October 2014 05:12 UTC
Науковий вісник ЧДІЕУ № 2 (22), 2014                                               Scientific journal of ChSIEM № 2 (22), 2014 
 
ЕКОНОМІКА ТА УПРАВЛІННЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИМ ГОСПОДАРСТВОМ 
 
 25
© Аliqoriev O., Khamidov Kh. S., 2014 
УДК 336.7:338.53:336.748.12 
Olimkhon F. Aliqoriev, PhD in Economics, senior researcher, 
Khalilillo Saydahmedovich Khamidov, intern researcher 
 
MONETARY POLICY UNDER INFLATION TARGETING: LESSONS FROM INDUSTRIAL  
AND EMERGING COUNTRIES 
 
Abstract. This article focuses on inflation targeting (hereafter IT) as a superior monetary policy 
strategy for attaining price stability, and its theoretical framework, prerequisites to introduce. The arti-
cle analyses benefits and costs of adoption of inflation targeting and also examines the IT experiences 
of some industrial and emerging markets. The growing body of empirical researches indicates that the 
adoption of IT is useful for countries that must enhance their credibility for the management of mone-
tary policy. Personally, the authors suggest that Uzbekistan should also take IT into account seriously 
and further consider. In the long run, without prejudice to the goal of price stability countries can 
achieve other objective: high employment, economic growth, financial markets stability, interest rate 
stability, and stability in foreign exchange markets. 
Keywords: inflation targeting, monetary policy, price stability, central bank. 
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МОНЕТАРНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА В РАМКАХ ИНФЛЯЦИОННОГО ТАРГЕТИРОВАНИЯ:  
УРОКИ ОТ ПРОМЫШЛЕННЫХ И РАЗВИВАЮЩИХСЯ СТРАН 
 
Аннотация. Статья посвящена вопросам инфляционного таргетирования (далее ИТ), 
рассматриваемого как оптимальная стратегия денежно-кредитной политики по достиже-
нию ценовой стабильности, аспектам и предпосылкам для внедрения данного режима. В 
статье анализируются выгоды и потери применения режима инфляционного таргетирова-
ния, а также изучается опыт некоторых развитых и развивающихся стран по применению 
ИТ. Увеличивающееся количество  эмпирических исследований показывает, что принятие 
инфляционного таргетирования является полезным для стран, которым необходимо повы-
сить уровень доверия. Авторы также предлагают рассмотреть возможность перехода на 
ИТ в Узбекистане. В долгосрочной перспективе, без ущерба для цели обеспечения стабиль-
ности цен, страны могут достичь и других целей: высокая занятость, экономический рост, 
стабильность финансовых и валютных рынков, стабильность процентных ставок.  
Ключевые слова: инфляционное таргетирование, денежно-кредитная политика, ценовая 
стабильность, Центральный банк. 
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МОНЕТАРНА ПОЛІТИКА В РАМКАХ ІНФЛЯЦІЙНОГО ТАРГЕТУВАННЯ: 
УРОКИ ВІД ПРОМИСЛОВИХ КРАЇН ТА КРАЇН, ЩО РОЗВИВАЮТЬСЯ 
 
Анотація. Стаття присвячена питанням інфляційного таргетування (далі ІТ), що розг-
лядається як оптимальна стратегія грошово-кредитної політики з досягнення цінової ста-
більності, аспектів і передумов для впровадження даного режиму. У статті аналізуються 
вигоди і втрати застосування режиму інфляційного таргетування, а також вивчається дос-
від деяких розвинених країн і країн, що розвиваються, щодо застосування ІТ. Зростаюча кіль-
кість емпіричних досліджень показує, що прийняття інфляційного таргетування є корисним 
для країн, яким необхідно підвищити рівень довіри. Автори також пропонують розглянути  
можливість переходу на ІТ в Узбекистані. У довгостроковій перспективі, без шкоди для мети 
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забезпечення стабільності цін, країни можуть досягти й інших цілей: висока зайнятість, 
економічне зростання, стабільність фінансових і валютних ринків, стабільність процентних 
ставок. 
Ключові слова: інфляційне таргетування, грошово-кредитна політика, цінова стабіль-
ність, Центральний банк. 
 
Introduction. Inflation is considered to be a major economic problem, especially in transition 
economies, because of its several adverse effects. Inflation can force people to pay inflation tax 
indirectly. As a result, people begin to worry about rapid increase in prices of consumer goods 
and services. High prices can create uncertainty and undermine confidence, and might hamper 
economic growth by affecting long-term decisions by domestic and foreign investors who find dif-
ficulty to plan for the future. Additionally, assuming that high uncertainty mirrors to higher risk 
premium, the higher will be the real cost of borrowing, which in turn will affect aggregate invest-
ment in the economy. Thus, fighting inflation and maintaining stable prices is increasingly viewed 
as the most important objective of monetary policy. The government authorities in charge of mon-
etary policy try to achieve lower inflation uncertainty by adopting sustainable fiscal and monetary 
policies. 
Thus, international financial institutions like IMF have periodically advised moving towards a 
more flexible exchange rate regime and inflation targeting. Over the last two decades, many cen-
tral banks have adopted inflation targeting as their optimal framework for pursuing an effective 
monetary policy to maintain a low and stable inflation in the long run. Many other central banks 
have acknowledged that monetary policy encourages employment and economic growth in the 
long-term mostly by conquering inflation. And then they are actively considering the applicability 
of this regime to their countries by assessing the benefits and costs of this increasingly popular 
monetary strategy and are making definite preparations to adopt the framework.  
What is inflation targeting? 
Inflation targeting is one of the operational frameworks within which monetary policy is con-
ducted to maintain price stability. In this framework, a central bank estimates and establishes tar-
get inflation rate and then attempts to steer actual inflation toward the target. The approach can 
be characterized by following aspects [1]:  
1) the central bank is publicly committed to official quantitative targets (or target ranges) for in-
flation rate over one or more time horizons; 
2) an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to 
which other goals are subordinated; 
3) an information inclusive strategy in which many variables (not just monetary aggregates or 
the exchange rate) are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments; 
4) increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication with the 
public and the markets about plans, objective, and decisions of the monetary authorities; 
5) increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives.  
Luca Benati and Charles Goodhart (2011) emphasize that a key feature of IT is that the central 
bank sets the target for inflation, which is then required to achieve by varying its main instrument 
such as the official short-term interest rate [2]. Lars E.O. Svensson (2011) concludes that inflation 
targeting is a monetary-policy strategy characterized by an announced numerical inflation target, 
an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an inflation forecast that has been 
called forecast targeting, and a high degree of transparency and accountability [3]. It is clear that 
countries have conducted three monetary policy strategies, all of which focus on price stability as 
the main, long-term objective of their monetary policy: exchange rate regime, monetary targeting, 
and inflation targeting. Among these strategies, inflation targeting is new-born strategy in which 
inflation expectations converge to inflation target. The decision made by many central banks to 
adopt inflation targets directly has resulted from the failure of alternative monetary policy regimes, 
based on either monetary or exchange rate targeting (see Diagram 1).   
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Diagram 1  
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 Source: The authors’ calculations 
 
For example, monetary base targeting experience in the US, Canada, Japan, and the United King-
dom shows that the money supply has a number of benefits. However, it is only advantageous when 
there is a strong and reliable correlation between the targeted monetary base and nominal income. In 
fact, the demand for money has displayed strong fluctuations and frequent structural changes over 
time. As a result, monetary targeting cannot achieve low inflation due to the breakdown of the relation-
ship between the money supply and the policy objective. 
Other popular nominal anchor is the adoption of predetermined path for the exchange rate with 
which the central bank has limited scope to conduct its own monetary policy and accepts limits on its 
capability to react to domestic or foreign shocks. For example, in 1992 exchange rate crisis spurred to 
the adoption of IT in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  
How does inflation targeting work? 
The central bank forecasts the appropriate level and measure of target inflation rate for stable eco-
nomic development and compares it with the target inflation rate. The monetary policy rule under infla-
tion targeting is simplified to 
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where Et πt+j is the inflation expectation, based on information available at time t, of the inflation 
rate j period ahead, conditioned on some path for the nominal interest rate it, and π* is the inflation 
target [4].  The difference between the forecast and the target determines to what degree monetary 
policy has to be adjusted to bring inflation back to the target. The target is typically specified as a 
point, with bands of plus or minus one percent. Some countries have chosen inflation targets with 
symmetrical ranges around a midpoint, while others have identified only a point target without any ex-
plicit range [5]. All countries have set their inflation targets in the low single digits (Table 1).  
Table 1  
Inflation targeting in selected group of countries 
Countries IT adoption 
date 
Inflation rate at 
adoption date 
(percent)
Current  inflation 
target rate (percent) 
Australia 1993 2.00 2-3 
Brazil 1999 3.30 4.5 +/-2 
Canada  1991 6.90 2 +/-1 
Chile 1999 3.20 3 +/-1 
Colombia 1999 9.30 2-4
Czech Republic 1998 6.80 3 +/-1 
Hungary  2001 10.80 3 +/-1 
Iceland  2001 4.10 2.50 +/-1.5 
Indonesia  2005 7.40 5 +/-1 
Israel 1997 8.10 2 +/-1 
Mexico 2001 9.00 3 +/-1 
New Zealand  1989 3.30 1-3 
Norway  2001 3.60 2.5 +/-1 
Peru  2002 -0.10 2 +/-1 
Philippines  2002 4.50 4 +/-1 
Poland  1998 10.60 2.5 +/-1 
Romania 2005 9.30 3 +/-1 
Korea, Republic of  2001 2.90 3 +/-1 
Sweden 1993 1.80 2.0
Thailand  2000 0.80 0.5-3.0 
Turkey  2006 7.70 5.5 +/-2 
United Kingdom 1992 4 2.0 
 
Sources: Hammond, 2011; Roger, 2010; and IMF staff calculation 
 
Under what conditions a country can adopt inflation targeting? 
Prerequisites for successful adoption of an inflation targeting framework vary across countries. 
However, in theory it’s identified that for successful operation of inflation targeting system following 
requirements should be met. First, a central bank must have instrument independence (not goal inde-
pendence) and a clear mandate for price stability. Second, requirement is a strong fiscal position and 
central bank should not be constrained to finance the government budget. Thus, all of the govern-
ment’s funding requirements should be met directly by nonmonetary means at relatively favourable 
terms. Third, central bank must have effective monetary policy instruments such as short-term interest 
rates and a well-understood transmission mechanism between these instruments and inflation. Fourth 
inflation targeting agencies have forecasting and modelling capabilities. Because of lags in monetary 
policy instruments, forward-looking and pre-emptive approach is very important to conduct monetary 
policy long before inflationary pressures appear in the economy. Fifth, central bank independence un-
der inflation targeting must be accompanied by improved accountability, transparency and communi-
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cation with the public. Finally, existence of stable financial markets in inflation targeting countries is 
equally-important [6].  
Debates over inflation targeting efficiency  
Advantages of IT 
Transparency, credibility, and communication. Since inflation targeting is medium-term objective, it is 
not frequently changed and thus helps the public better understand and evaluate the performance of the 
central bank. Having been informed where monetary policy is, the economic agents can plan the future 
interest rate, investment based on their inflation expectations. In turn, central bank can secure full credi-
bility for price stability with understanding of the government and the public. Therefore, a high credibility 
in the policy will be achieved by frequent and transparent communication with the public (e.g. inflation 
report, pamphlets, open letters, resource material, speeches, articles, interviews, and a functioning web-
site). By doing so, the central bank explains the following concepts to the general public, financial market 
participants, and the government:  1) the goals and limitations of monetary policy, including the rationale 
for inflation targets; 2) the numerical values of the inflation targets and how they were determined; 3) 
how the inflation targets are to be achieved, given current economic conditions; 4) reasons for any devia-
tions from targets. The transparency increases the accountability of the central bank.       
Accountability. Because the central banks are mandated and commits to a quantitative target, they 
have to account for meeting their targets to win the public trust.  
Lower economic cost in the onset of target failure. Economic costs of failures of exchange rate pegs 
or money growth targeting might be massive reserve losses, high inflation, financial and banking crises, 
and possibly debt defaults. Comparatively, missing the target might lead to higher inflation than the tar-
geted and output growth may slower temporarily.   
Disadvantages of IT 
Delayed signaling. Because of different lags in the effect of monetary policy, some have criticized IT 
signaling for being too late. Typically, changes in interest rate first affect output and then affect inflation. 
Despite of this, taking into account long lags of its instruments, central banks in IT regimes have clear 
understanding of transmission mechanism between these instruments and inflation as well as forecast 
modelling capabilities with forward-looking and pre-emptive approach.      
Too much rigidity. Rigid rules and limitations of the ability in inflation targeting framework to respond 
to speculative shocks of IT have been criticized by some economists. However, in practice the countries 
in inflation targeting regime have adopted more flexible IT to achieve the trade-off between inflation vari-
ability and output variability through several instruments by using all available information. Inflation tar-
gets might be modified in some circumstances to stabilize the economy.  
Increased output fluctuations. Critics of IT have argued that IT focuses on inflation as the only goal for 
monetary policy and thus ignore other goals such as high employment, financial stability, and economic 
growth that lead to larger output fluctuations. However, in reality central banks in inflation targeting re-
gimes determine inflation targets above zero because of their concern of that deflation can have sub-
stantial adverse effects on real economic activity (e.g. recent deflation experience of Japan). Moreover, 
the levels of short-term interest affect expenditure and savings, and in turn, prices. As, according to the 
Taylor rule, short-term interest rate has ripple effect on inflation, monetary authorities care about both 
inflation and output fluctuations. 
 Due to the presence of an output gap in the Taylor rule, central bank cannot ignore output fluctua-
tions.      
Low economic growth. In the short run, inflation targeting central bank may aggressively respond to 
inflationary pressures that could temporarily lead to reduction in potential output. When stable low infla-
tion levels were ensured, output and employment returned to normal levels. In the long run, there is no 
time inconsistency problem between the price stability and the other goal of monetary policy.  The empir-
ical results conclude that in many IT countries, strong economic growth and price stability has been 
achieved in tandem. 
International experience  
Since its introduction in New Zealand in December 1989, number of central banks that have adopted 
explicit inflation targeting (IT) as a monetary policy framework has been increasing. Batini and Laxton 
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(2006) survey the experience of 31 emerging markets by comparing the performance of the IT countries 
with non-IT countries and show that there are significant improvements in anchoring inflation and infla-
tion expectations with no adverse effects on output [6]. They also add that in countries with IT regime 
interest rates, exchange rates, and international reserves are less volatile, and the risk of currency crises 
relative to money or exchange rate targets is smaller. In their case, it is not mandatory to meet a strin-
gent set of institutional, technical, and economic prerequisites so as to switch to IT successfully. Scott 
Roger (2009) investigates that countries which have adopted inflation targeting framework have tenta-
tively coped better with the commodity price and financial shocks in 2007-2009 than non-inflation target-
ers. 
New Zealand experience   
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, in 1989 was granted the independence and set the single objec-
tive of price stability. The first Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) was signed in March of 1990. It was de-
signed to lend more discipline and accountability to the conduct of monetary policy. The Governor would 
be given explicit policy goals, and his performance would be judged accordingly. Inflation targeting within 
3-5 % was introduced in the midst of a number of reforms including substantial industry deregulation, 
privatization and corporatization within the state enterprise sector, major reductions in barriers to interna-
tional trade, sweeping tax reforms, labour market reforms, removal of industry subsidies, the complete 
removal of all capital controls and the subsequent free floating of the exchange rate, and rigorous and 
comprehensive fiscal reforms. Those reforms were helpful in restraining inflation (Figure 1). From Sep-
tember 2002 onwards, the inflation target has averaged within a range of 1-3 per cent.  Since 1990 the 
mean of CPI inflation has been around 2.5%. This compares with averages of around 12% in the 1970s 
and 11% in the 1980s. As a result, over the 20 years New Zealand’s growth rate has been high, with 
some years exceeding 5%, and unemployment has come down significantly. Even though the RBNZ 
missed its target during the global financial crisis, it managed to steer inflation back to averaged 1.15 % 
in 2013. Owing to the price stability, annual GDP growth is expected to average about 3 percent through 
2014 before moderating from early 2015.  
Figure 1 
Annual inflation in New Zealand 
(in percent per year) 
 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, the RBNZ. Notes: Interest rates are excluded.  
 
Japan experience  
Even though Japan is not a formal IT country, the Bank of Japan has been battling its biggest 
headache - deflation that has lasted for nearly 15 years since 1998, targeting the 2 percent price sta-
bility target adopted in January 2013. Since April 2013, the Bank of Japan introduced quantitative and 
Науковий вісник ЧДІЕУ № 2 (22), 2014                                               Scientific journal of ChSIEM № 2 (22), 2014 
 
ЕКОНОМІКА ТА УПРАВЛІННЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИМ ГОСПОДАРСТВОМ 
 
 31
© Аliqoriev O., Khamidov Kh. S., 2014 
qualitative monetary easing (QQE) that further strengthened existing monetary easing to boost do-
mestic consumption. Because of a slowdown in big trade partners such as the US and Euro zone and 
increased competition from Chinese and South Korean producers, Japan’s economy had been quite 
depressed. That is why the large expansionary policies targeting 2 percent price stability to stimulate 
the economy has helped to end the decade-long deflation in 2013 [7].   
Mexico experience  
In the late of 1990s and the early of 2000s emerging markets – East Asia (1997), Ecuador (1999), 
Turkey (2000-2001) experienced the currency and financial crisis. Similarly, during 1994-1995 banking 
and financial crisis was keeping Mexican policymakers and economics guru awaken at nights to find 
ways how to get out of the crisis as quickly as possible and stabilize the economy. The implemented 
several measures and the adoption of a consistent macroeconomic program immediately after the cri-
sis ensured Mexico’s success in stabilizing the economy.  In this process, inflation has decreased from 
close to 52 percent in 1996 to levels close to 3 per cent over the last decade, under a flexible ex-
change rate regime (Figure 2). Since 2003 the conduction of monetary policy in Mexico has sought to 
converge inflation towards its 3 % permanent target which has the minimum cost to economic activity 
though inflation target was missed during the global crisis. In 2013 annual inflation remained within the 
interval of the target, at 3,83% level.      
Figure 2 
Annual inflation and inflation targets in Mexico 
(in percent per year) 
 
 
Source: Bank of Mexico 
 
As Uzbekistan continues its stable macroeconomic strategy, we also have to assess the introduc-
tion of the new scheme by in-depth examination of experiences in both industrial and emerging econ-
omies. Frank Hespeler (2011) concludes that in Uzbekistan the stronger monetary policy should com-
plete to wring inflation and  
devaluation expectations out of the economy and pave the way to the gradual abandoning of crawl-
ing peg, and in turn, should introduce an inflation targeting policy in the long run.  
Conclusion 
The aforementioned brief information and experiences in industrial and emerging markets prove 
that inflation targeting has been successful in many countries in reducing inflation and maintaining it at 
low levels. In addition, no empirical analysis shows that switching to inflation targeting framework has 
had deleterious results on the real economy beyond the very short run. However, a country that is 
moving toward IT regime has to take into account financial sector development, the ability of the cen-
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tral bank to implement policy using indirect, market-based instruments, the availability of the timely 
good quality data for forecasting purposes, the macroeconomic outlook, risks and uncertainties. 
Inflation targeting can be a powerful tool to secure macroeconomic stability in the long-run period. 
Derived conclusions support the idea that IT can be applied to industrial, emerging and transition 
economies. As the researchers indicate that since inflation targeting offers a number of operational 
advantages alongside with relatively few and manageable drawbacks, it can be identified as effective 
monetary strategy countries should take serious consideration.  
Therefore, Uzbekistan has to seriously consider two different monetary regimes under inflation tar-
geting: flexible IT when the monetary authority handle only one tool-the interest rate, and “hybrid” infla-
tion targeting when objectives of the monetary authority include output and exchange rate interven-
tions. Because exchange rate fluctuations is complicated problem for central banks who engage in 
flexible inflation targeting, for Uzbekistan, the latter may appropriately be offered due to high percent-
age of exports and imports in its GDP.     
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